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COMMENTARY / VIEWPOINTS

By Mitchell M. Gans
Mitchell M. Gans is a professor of law at Hofstra
University School of Law.
Retroactive reimposition of the estate tax raises
constitutional questions. After explaining his policy
preference for retroactivity, Gans considers these constitutional questions. He then outlines a severability
provision that Congress might consider adopting to
minimize the risk that retroactivity would be found
unconstitutional.
Copyright 2010 Mitchell M. Gans.
All rights reserved.
Under legislation enacted in 2001, the estate tax is
repealed for individuals dying during 2010. On January
1, 2011, this legislation sunsets, and the estate tax becomes fully operative once again. In the absence of new
legislation, a person dying with great wealth in 2010
escapes the estate tax, whereas a person with similar
wealth dying in 2009 or 2011 would be subject to the tax.
It is difficult to justify that discrimination as a policy
matter. New York Times columnist Paul Krugman wrote a
critical blog post about the legislation shortly after its
enactment, entitled ‘‘Throwing Momma From the Train.’’
In December 2009 the House passed a bill that would
retain the tax during 2010, freezing in place the rates and
the exemption amounts that were effective during 2009.
Unfortunately, the Senate adjourned at the end of the
year without taking up estate tax legislation. It is widely
anticipated that the Senate will consider legislation that
would extend the tax into 2010 early in the new session.
The question that many are asking is whether that
legislation can constitutionally be made retroactive to the
beginning of the year.
Bracketing the constitutional issue for the moment, I
would favor a retroactive approach. To be sure, retroactivity could produce troubling results as a policy matter:
A person who had arranged her affairs in reliance on the
2001 legislation and who died before the enactment of the
new legislation would obviously be unable to modify her
dispositive scheme. Simply put, planning embedded in a
will followed by death produces a form of reliance that
should not be cavalierly dismissed. Indeed, it is because
reliance interests are so strong in this context that courts
are reluctant to overrule estate-related precedent. But the
inequity that results from permitting a person to escape
the tax because of a ‘‘fortuitous’’ death in early 2010 is
even more troubling. In other words, between these
unappealing alternatives, I would choose equity over
reliance. While, in the abstract, such a choice would be
difficult to make, I find it easy in that I am skeptical about
the depth of planning-related reliance on the 2001 legislation. Short of ‘‘suicide in contemplation of repeal,’’
planning built on the premise of repeal is likely to be
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intentionally designed to game the system without much
nontax significance hanging in the balance.
My policy preference leads me directly to the constitutional question. I believe that while this question is not
entirely free from doubt, Congress could design retroactive legislation that would likely be immune from constitutional attack.
I turn first to the last word from the Supreme Court on
the constitutionality of retroactive taxation. In United
States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994), an executor took
advantage of a loophole inadvertently included in 1986
tax legislation. After the decedent’s death, he purchased
marketable securities on December 10, 1986, and immediately sold them two days later to the issuer’s employee stock ownership plan for a price slightly less than
cost. When he filed the estate tax return on December 29,
1986, he claimed a deduction under what was then
section 2057 of the code in an amount equal to half of the
sales proceeds. A few weeks later, on January 5, 1987, the
IRS announced that, pending additional legislation, it
would not permit such a deduction unless the decedent
had owned the stock before death. In February 1987 a bill
was introduced that would amend section 2057 to adopt
the IRS’s view. The senator who introduced the bill
indicated that Congress never intended to permit the
deduction based on such a postdeath acquisition of stock.
On December 22, 1987, approximately one year after the
transaction was consummated, Congress enacted the bill
and made it retroactive to the date of the 1986 legislation.
Not denying the transaction was undertaken for the
purpose of taking advantage of the loophole, the executor argued the retroactivity provision was unconstitutional under the due process clause.
The Court rejected the executor’s argument and upheld the retroactive application of the amendment. The
majority reasoned that under the clause, retroactive legislation does have to satisfy a burden that is not imposed
on prospective legislation. It said there must be a ‘‘rational legislative purpose’’ that justifies retroactivity.
Finding in the circumstances such a legislative purpose,
the majority found no constitutional violation. The executor relied on some earlier cases — so-called Lochnerera cases — in which the Court had subjected economic
legislation to exacting review. The majority first pointed
out that the Court no longer applies such an exacting
standard of review in the case of economic legislation. It
then, most critically, emphasized that the cases have been
limited to the retroactive imposition of a ‘‘wholly new
tax.’’ In Carlton, by contrast, the amendment was simply
an adjustment to the preexisting estate tax. The majority
also emphasized that the period of retroactivity was of
modest duration and that Congress was merely trying to
fix a mistake that would otherwise cost $7 billion in lost
revenue, which was 20 times more than Congress had
anticipated.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia,
joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, made his nowfamiliar argument that substantive due process is an
oxymoron. On this view, the due process clause should
not be used to strike down legislation that is substantively unfair. It should instead be confined to cases in
which process rights are violated (for example, a person
is deprived of property without a hearing). And, of
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To this end, consider the inclusion of a severability
provision in retroactive estate tax legislation that would
subject the legatee to an income tax on the inheritance if
the estate tax were determined to be unconstitutional.
More specifically, the legislation could provide that in the
event of such a determination, a legatee would not be
permitted to exclude the inheritance from income under
section 102 of the code. Instead it would be taxed under
section 61, just like any other item of income. Congress
could even impose a special rate of tax on the legatee for
the inheritance — equal to the estate tax rate — and could
also provide that the tax would only apply if the decedent died with more than, say, $3.5 million in taxable
estate. Making this amendment to section 102 retroactive
to the beginning of the year should significantly undermine the constitutional argument inasmuch as it would
simply adjust the preexisting income tax and would
therefore not violate the new tax principle.
In sum, Carlton, as well as Darusmont, reflects a
willingness to tolerate retroactive changes in the preexisting income tax. The severability provision suggested
would offer the advantage of converting the constitutional analysis from a focus on a new transfer tax to a
consideration of a change in the income tax. This shift in
focus should make the legislation less vulnerable to
constitutional attack and thereby make retroactivity more
secure.
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course, the putative deficiency in retroactive taxation is
substantive, not procedural. But at the same time, not
surprisingly, Justice Scalia acknowledged his distaste for
what he called ‘‘bait-and-switch taxation’’ — a policybased objection to the substantive nature of the legislation. In cases involving retroactive taxation, conservative
jurists understandably face a difficult choice: acknowledging that the concept of substantive due process has
content (which would have implications in terms of
personal rights, like abortion or the criminalization of sex
between same-sex couples) or instead allowing economic
rights to be taken away unfairly (which, as the jurisprudence under the takings clause reflects, is the subject of
considerable conservative resistance).
In any event, what does Carlton suggest about the
constitutional prospects of a retroactive estate tax? It is
clear that, as in Carlton, early enactment of the legislation
would weigh in its favor. But Carlton would be distinguishable in important respects. First, unlike in Carlton,
repeal of the estate tax under the 2001 legislation was not
an oversight resulting in a loophole capable of producing
an unanticipated loss of substantial revenue. Quite the
contrary, Congress in 2001 carefully examined the cost of
repeal and made a deliberate choice. Second, in terms of
reliance, a person who writes a will based on an understanding about the tax law and then dies is in a vastly
different position from the executor in Carlton, who after
the decedent’s death purchased and then sold securities
for approximately the same price in order to exploit
Congress’s drafting error. Third, and most important, the
Court in Carlton left intact the notion that the retroactive
imposition of a ‘‘wholly new tax’’ is constitutionally
problematic.
Unlike the amendment in Carlton, a retroactive imposition of the estate tax might well be seen as a constitutionally defective new tax. Indeed, the earlier cases cited
in Carlton for the new tax principle involved the retroactive imposition of the gift tax. In United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292 (1981), the Court, in explaining these
earlier cases, emphasized that the gift tax legislation was
not enacted until after the donor had vested ownership in
the donee and had surrendered all rights. The question,
of course, is whether a retroactive imposition of the estate
tax would be viewed by the Court as a new tax given that
it was effective in 2009 and will, under current law,
become effective again in 2011. The outcome is difficult to
predict. Nonetheless, it would not be difficult to imagine
a decision striking down retroactive estate tax legislation
on the grounds that it imposed a new tax, with the Court
analogizing to the earlier gift tax cases and the vested
ownership analysis. Indeed, given the distaste for retroactive taxation reflected in Justice Scalia’s opinion, it
would not be surprising if even he — along with his
conservative colleagues — were to conclude, despite the
discomfort with substantive due process, that precedent
required a rejection of retroactive application of the estate
tax on the grounds that it constituted a new tax.
Given this uncertainty, what might Congress do to
improve the prospects of retroactive estate tax legislation? The most difficult hurdle for it under the Carlton
framework is the new tax concept. If this concept could
be sidestepped, the probability that the legislation would
pass muster would be greatly increased.

